CEO Professional Horizon, Management Myopia, and Corporate ESG Performance
Journal: Modern Economics & Management Forum DOI: 10.32629/memf.v5i6.3179
Abstract
ESG governance is crucial for the development of new quality productive forces, and the increased disclosure of ESG reports by listed companies makes it a key measure of corporate sustainable development. This study, based on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share data from 2013 to 2023, explores the impact of CEO professional horizon on ESG performance. The results show that: (1) CEO professional horizon significantly enhances corporate ESG performance, and this relationship remains robust after robustness tests; (2) CEOs with a professional horizon are more likely to make long-term investments and reduce short-sighted behavior, thereby promoting ESG performance; (3) In non-state-owned enterprises and highly competitive industries, the positive impact of CEO professional horizon on ESG performance is more pronounced.
Keywords
CEO Professional Horizon; ESG; Upper Echelon Theory
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[3]Holmstrom B. Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999(1): 169-182.
[4]Lin Y,Fu X,Fu X.Varieties in state capitalism and corporate innovation: Evidence from an emerging economy[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2021,67:101919.
[5]Li Y, Xu X, Zhu Y,et al. CEO decision horizon and corporate R&D investments: an explanation based on managerial myopia and risk aversion[J].Accounting & Finance[2024-07-29].
[6]Oh W Y,Chang Y K,Cheng Z. When CEO career horizon problems matter for corporate social responsibility:The moderating roles of industry-level discretion andblockholder ownership[J]. Journal of Business Ethics,2016,133(2): 279-291.
[7]Hu Nan, Xue Fujing, Wang Haonan. Does Managerial Myopia Affect Corporate Long-term Investment? — Based on Text Analysis and Machine Learning [J]. Management World, 2021(5): 139-156.
[8]Zhang Hui, Huang Qunhui. Institutional Pressure, Dominant CEOs, and the Fulfillment of ESG Responsibilities by Listed Companies [J]. Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, 2022, 44(09): 74-86.
[9]Zhai Xiaoyue, Zhao Gongmin, Wu Yongjie. The Impact of Managerial Myopia on Corporate ESG Performace [J]. Coal Economic Research, 2024, 44(01): 227-234.
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