X Holding's Delisting: A Probing Internal Audit Analysis and Organizational Structure Innovations in Internal Audit
Journal: Modern Economics & Management Forum DOI: 10.32629/memf.v5i5.2908
Abstract
X Holding has been punished by CSRC and forced to delist by SSE due to its regulatory violations. This study delves into issues existing in X Holding from an incisive perspective of internal audit, such as irregular decision-making process, unreasonable use of funds, the phenomenon of one person holding two positions, insufficient establishment and functioning of the supervisory board, and irregularities in the recruitment of external audit. Combining with the practical experience, the study emphasizes the decentralized power of enterprises and the establishment of mutually restrictive and well-functioning internal audit organizational structure, and its importance to the independence, authenticity and impartiality of internal audit. Concluding several items that auditors need to pay particular attention to in the process of internal audit. Furthermore, the study researches the organizational structures of internal audit commonly adopted in practice by Chinese enterprises and concludes a well-functioning internal audit organizational structure. Ultimately, the study provides a prospective on audit under the background of the new Securities Law.
Keywords
internal audit perspective; internal audit organizational structure; centralized power
Full Text
PDF - Viewed/Downloaded: 2 TimesReferences
[1]Fang Hongxing, Sun Hao, Jin Yunyun. Company Characteristics, External Audit, and Voluntary Disclosure of Internal Control Information: An Empirical Study Based on the Annual Reports of Shanghai Stock Exchange Listed Companies from 2003 to 2005. Journal of Accounting Research, 2009(10): 44-52. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2009.10.007.
[2]Liu Qiliang, Luo Le, Zhang Yaman, et al. Executive Centralization of Power, Internal Control, and Accounting Information Quality. Nankai Business Review, 2013(1). DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1008-3448.2013.01.003.
[3]Gan Shengdao, Hu Mingxia. Managerial Power, Internal Control, and Overinvestment: Evidence from State-owned Listed Companies. Audit and Economic Research, 2014, 29(5): 40-47. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-4833.2014.05.005.
[4]Li Shigang, Jiang Yaoming. Does the Tone of Textual Information in Annual Reports of Listed Companies Affect Audit Opinions? [J]. Accounting Research, 2020(5): 178-192. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2020.05.013.
[5]LI Qing, Yan Shigang. Research on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Internal Control Index[J]. Journal of Social Sciences of Jilin University, 2020, 60(6): 167-178. DOI:10.15939/j.jujsse.2020.06.jj4.
[2]Liu Qiliang, Luo Le, Zhang Yaman, et al. Executive Centralization of Power, Internal Control, and Accounting Information Quality. Nankai Business Review, 2013(1). DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1008-3448.2013.01.003.
[3]Gan Shengdao, Hu Mingxia. Managerial Power, Internal Control, and Overinvestment: Evidence from State-owned Listed Companies. Audit and Economic Research, 2014, 29(5): 40-47. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-4833.2014.05.005.
[4]Li Shigang, Jiang Yaoming. Does the Tone of Textual Information in Annual Reports of Listed Companies Affect Audit Opinions? [J]. Accounting Research, 2020(5): 178-192. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2020.05.013.
[5]LI Qing, Yan Shigang. Research on the Impact of Corporate Governance on Internal Control Index[J]. Journal of Social Sciences of Jilin University, 2020, 60(6): 167-178. DOI:10.15939/j.jujsse.2020.06.jj4.
Copyright © 2024 Yuqi Liu
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License