Why Can the Frail Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait be Preserved? Analyzing the Econ-political Synergy among China, Taiwan, and United States

Journal: Modern Economics & Management Forum DOI: 10.32629/memf.v3i6.1103

Chenxi Shen

Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan


This paper uses analytic eclecticism to answer why the fragile status quo in the Taiwan Strait remains resilient. After pragmatically framing the research question, this research chooses three symbolic scenes in the Taiwan Strait: (1) Beijing’s economic statecraft towards Taiwan; (2) Taiwan’s soft power in finding the leeway out of its international dilemma; (3) The Sino-America competition over the narration in the cross-Strait relations. As a practice of eclecticism where the analytical framework is constructed based on each major school of international relations theories, this paper combines cases and theoretical tools to draw the whole picture of Taiwan issues. Ultimately, this research reached empirical and theoretical conclusions, calling for an innovative international relations theory that observes political phenomena conceptually and practically.


analytic eclecticism, relations between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (cross-Strait relations), China, Taiwan, United States


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