Journal: Modern Economics & Management Forum DOI: 10.32629/memf.v7i4.5448
Abstract
This article examines why the European Union has struggled to translate the European Chips Act into effective strategic autonomy. Using Liberal Intergovernmentalism, it analyses the EU’s framing of semiconductors as strategic technologies and national bargaining over implementation. It focuses on diverging German and French priorities, unequal fiscal capacity, relaxed state-aid rules and the 2025 European Court of Auditors report. Member states endorse semiconductor sovereignty while pursuing industrial interests: wealthier governments mobilise subsidies, whereas EU institutions lack independent resources. The Act’s market-share target and sovereignty rhetoric therefore exceed its implementation mechanisms. The principal constraint is not insufficient European ambition but political fragmentation among states with unequal preferences and capacities.
Keywords
strategic autonomy, european chips act, liberal intergovernmentalism, semiconductor policy, political fragmentation
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[16]Fiott D. European Sovereignty: Strategy and Interdependence. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies; 2021. Chaillot Paper 169.
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