Official Promotion Deviation and Regional Debt Expansion

Journal: Modern Economics & Management Forum DOI: 10.32629/memf.v6i6.4662

Xixing Huang

Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, Guizhou, China

Abstract

Using the panel data of cities from 2006 to 2021, this paper empirically examines the impact of officials' promotion deviation on local debt divergence in different regions. We find that when local officials flow from cities with higher economic endowments to cities with lower economic endowments, the difficulty of promotion will further strengthen their borrowing behavior, which will lead to the increase of local government debt. The results of this paper provide a useful reference for the governance of local government debt and the further optimization of the official evaluation system.

Keywords

local government debt; debt differentiation; official promotion tournament theory; official promotion deviation

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