Succession Models and Third-Party Facilitation in Family Firms: A Case Study of Guangdong, China

Journal: Modern Economics & Management Forum DOI: 10.32629/memf.v5i3.2271

Nobuyuki Kumoi1, Lin Wang2, Jiarui Xu3

1. Faculty of Economics, Niigata Sangyo University, Kashiwazaki 9451393, Niigata, Japan
2. School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou 510006, Guangdong, China
3. Faculty of Current Business, Kyushu International University, Kitakyushu 8058512, Fukuoka, Japan

Abstract

Family firms hold a significant position in China's private sector, especially in Guangdong, where Lingnan culture profoundly influences their operations. This study investigates succession practices in four publicly listed family firms in Guangdong — Vanward, Zhongyeda, Nan, and Country Garden — by analyzing their financial indicators and conducting a textual emotion analysis. The results indicate that third-party facilitation during succession is a common and effective practice, ensuring smoother transitions. Four distinct succession models were identified: tutorial-based, team-oriented, sibling-collaborative, and spousal-inclusive. The study underscores the importance of implementing exit mechanisms to mitigate the risks associated with third-party involvement. These insights contribute to the broader discourse on family business management in China, offering theoretical and practical implications for effective leadership succession in a rapidly evolving business landscape.

Keywords

family firms, primogeniture succession, third-party facilitation, succession models

Funding

Guangdong Province Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project, Grant Number (GD23XGL062)

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Copyright © 2024 Nobuyuki Kumoi, Lin Wang, Jiarui Xu

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