U.S. Semi-Conductor Policy: The Limits of Alliance and Sanction
Journal: Modern Economics & Management Forum DOI: 10.32629/memf.v5i1.1601
Abstract
This study analyzes the Biden administration's semiconductor export control policy toward China in order to fully understand the background, purpose and potential impact of the policy. In the context of increasingly fierce competition in the global semiconductor market, this move by the US government has attracted widespread attention from the international community. This paper first sorts out the specific content and implementation details of Biden administration's semiconductor export control to China, and then focuses on two obstacles that the policy may face in the implementation process. The paper further discusses the impact of these restrictions on the effectiveness of semiconductor regulatory policies for China. The analysis shows that although the US export control policy can restrict China's access to advanced semiconductor technology to some extent, its actual effect may be restricted by many factors, including the risk of technology leakage, the complexity of international cooperation and the uncertainty of market competition. Therefore, this paper argues that the Biden administration's semiconductor export control policy needs to be adjusted and perfected in the process of implementation to meet various challenges and changes.
Keywords
semiconductor, Sino-US Relations, trade sanction
Funding
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2023JX064)
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